The Kurdish government has skillfully played its own game
What is the importance of the Kurdish question in Iraqi and Middle Eastern policies, especially in the context of the democratization process?
Since the collapse of the Ottoman empire and, as a consequence, the drawing of Iraq, Iranian, Syrian and Turkish borders, the Kurdish question has been a central issue in the region. The Kurdish question is not as widely publicized as the Palestinian question, except during violent and dramatic events in Kurdish history. As the Palestinian question involves the three monotheistic religions, making it important to the world, the Kurdish question takes root on a spatial and human crossroads, among Turks, Arabs and Persians and three geographical areas: Anatolia, Iran and Mesopotamia. Kurdistan is economically important, as it is an oil-producing area and holds the sources of Tigris and Euphrates rivers. As long as there is still a Kurdish question, the Middle East cannot enjoy stability and peace. States that occupied Kurdish areas made the same calculations, and decided the best way to eliminate the Kurdish question was to eliminate the Kurds.
Fortunately, Kurds have several ways to ensure their own survival. The Kurdish population of 25 to 30 million makes them hard to suppress. Secondly, the mountains provide a natural fortress to protect the Kurds, giving truth to the old saying, “Mountains are the Kurds’ friends.” Kurds are traditionally independent, and resist the control of central powers. Because the Kurds are divided among four states, it makes it difficult for those states to join forces against the Kurds. The states have constantly used their neighbors’ Kurds as pawns to further their rivalries. While this has prevented the Kurds from unifying themselves in a single movement, it has allowed political parties and armed troops to find shelter beyond the borders.
How do you see the situation of the Kurds in Turkey?
In Turkey, the Kurds’ situation is incomparably better than it has been for decades, despite the troubles they still face. Since the founding of the Turkish Republic, Kurdistan in Turkey has been the site of terrible massacres, comparable to the Anfal, Ararat Revolt in 1930, the Dersim repression in 1938, the “dirty war” of the 1990s. Today, violence and deportations have decreased substantially while Ankara tries to follow the Copenhagen criteria in its quest to join the European Union. But the toll has been heavy. In Iraqi Kurdistan, almost 4,000 villages were destroyed during the 1990s, and millions of Kurds were displaced to shantytowns or suburban areas, causing economic hardship. While around 40,000 people lost their lives, more have been psychologically and physically injured.
Moreover, while it has never been the case in Iraq, an official and total negation of Kurds’ reality, history and existence has cut off two or three generations from their roots and history. Using the Kurdish language and teaching it are still problematic in Turkey, despite of the recent legislative tolerance. Writing and reading in Kurdish is still a daily struggle.
However, when a threshold has been passed, it is impossible to return. I remember well that my first exchange in Kurdish happened in Istanbul, in a restaurant, with a waiter from Bingöl. He was upset by the fact that, in France, students could learn Kurdish like any foreign language. “What they say to us here is wrong! We do have a language and an alphabet,” he said. Today, this would not happen. With the spread of Kurdish media, TV, newspapers, books, the Internet, Kurds in Turkey no longer believe they are simply the “Turks of the mountains.” Turkey has no other choice, if it wants democracy, than to accept its Kurds, or to separate them.
How do you see the situation of the Kurds in Iraq?
Obviously, the situation of Kurds in Iraq is, nowadays, is the best in all Kurdistan, especially within the Kurdistan Region. Of course, political obstacles remain and Kurds should not rest on their laurels. No state will agree willingly to an autonomous Kurdistan, let alone independence. But now, they have been obliged to accept autonomy.
As they are landlocked, Kurds need the “political umbrella” of Iraq, at least for the time being. Their chance is that Iraq is, since the falling of the Baath regime, a weak state, sometimes a ghost state. Despite internal divisions, which are also a sign of democracy, Kurds unite when they have to defend their own interests in Baghdad.
Do the United States and European countries have any policy or strategy toward the Kurds as a nation?
I don’t think that any European country or the United States have a real wish to see the rise of Kurds as a nation. They would consider it as a factor of instability in a troubled region. The U.S., which is, since 2003, one of the main forces, and also a referee, in the Iraqi battlefield, accepted a federal Iraq only because of Arabs’ hostility. As it did not choose its friends, it needs to treat the Kurds tactfully. Moreover, it doesn’t want to appear as the instigator of the Iraqi disintegration, nor jeopardize its alliance with the Turks. Basically, its strategy toward the Kurds has been almost nonexistent since the occupation of Iraq. It has acted step by step as the reality on the ground thwarted its plans. So far, the Kurds have managed to resist the pressure and waited for the tide to turn in their favor. For example, they refused the entry of Turkish troops in Kurdistan, just before the Coalition attack in 2003. It could have been an embarrassing confrontation for the U.S., shared between Turks and Kurds. But suddenly, the Turkish parliament voted against the passage of Coalition troops in the country, forcing the U.S. to abandon a second front from the north. At this moment, the Turks lost their chance to implant militarily in Kirkuk.
In conclusion, the rise of a Kurdish state entity is not the wish of the U.S. nor the EU, but the civil war and terrorism out of Kurdistan have forced them to accept the Kurdish Region as an independent area.
What are your thoughts on the record of Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and its leadership?
So far, the Kurdish government has skillfully played its own game, with an unstable Iraq and an aggressive Turkey. It appears as a safe and peaceful place, with great social and economic dynamism. We have to remember from where Kurdistan started its path to freedom in 1992, and the level of destruction. The results are impressive. Of course, they pay the price of moving so fast and perhaps not being completely organized. Kurds have an economic boom, a crowd of foreign investors, many modern buildings and a new, wealthy class of citizens. Meanwhile, there are still ruined villages, refugees, poor people and farming which has not returned to its pre-Anfal level. There’s also a need for infrastructure, electricity and employment. The paradox is that with a huge percent of government workers among the population, and a great number of unemployed, Kurdistan attracts many migrant workers. This causes social tension, for example between the younger generation that hardly experienced the war and veterans who used to lead the country. All these tensions are normal, perhaps inevitable. Another paradox is that the cohesion of Kurdistan is derived from its precarious position, encircled by hostile neighbors. Kurds have no choice but to stay firmly united. The dark days of the war in 1992 are remembered. Today, a political faction that favors force would be probably be rejected.
How could the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq help to settle the Kurdish question in Turkey?
The Kurdish question in Turkey has a large impact on political relations between Ankara and Erbil. For the moment, I don’t believe the Kurdish Regional Government should change the position and tactics it has always used. The position is that it is not the KRG’s problem, but an internal Turkish issue. Ankara should peacefully resolve its conflict with Kurds in Turkey and, in any case, we will not fight against other Kurds.
In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan offers economical and cultural opportunities to Kurds from Turkey and elsewhere. They can work, study, travel, meet other Kurds, organize artistic or social events. In general, Iraqi Kurdistan is a place of freedom for all Kurds in the region, as long as it does not harm foreign relations in the region. Let’s remember that it is the only place in the world where Kurdish is an official language and it has a historical impact on Kurdish identity and culture.
What are your expectations and advice for the Iraqi KRG―especially towards Kirkuk question―and Kurdish parties in Turkey ?
The issue of Kirkuk has always been the main obstacle in the peace process between Baghdad and Erbil. But, we should not forget the status of the other areas mentioned in the Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, such as Sinjar, Sheikhan and Makhmur. Their populations also have the right to decide if their own fate should be in or out of the Kurdish Region. For the moment, their future is blocked with the Kirkukis’ one. Currently, it seems difficult to immediately apply the census and the referendum, even if the Kurdish government has every reason to reiterate its determination on that point.
Ideally, Kirkuk would need a real program of reconstruction, renovation and development of infrastructure and more assistance to the returning refugees. But who can provide this? For the moment, Kirkuk is not integrated in the Kurdish Region but receives some help from Baghdad. As long as the management of Kirkuk is not clearly divided between Baghdad and Erbil, these questions will not be answered.
In an atmosphere of good faith and goodwill, we could consider a temporary common management of the province by both Iraq and Kurdistan, during a period of five or even 10 years. After that, when the situation is stable, the Article 140 process could be implemented, allowing the communities of Kirkuk to choose. It could be applied sooner in other disputed areas, like Sinjar or Sheikhan, but I doubt that this much goodwill currently exists among political factions. It will take more time, perhaps 20 or 30 years. There could also be external pressure, for example from the U.S., which is anxious to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible, but without leaving the country in total chaos.
Sandrine Alexie studied at the École du Louvre (School of the Louvre Museum), graduated in 1993 in Arts and Civilization (specialized in Islam), and got a High Studies of Museology Diploma in 1994. In parallel, she learned Kurdish language and civilization in the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO).
She traveled extensively in Kurdistan (Syria, Turkey, Iraq), studying Medieval architecture and working with local groups for human rights, refugees, political prisoners and cultural oppression. Her aim was to make the Kurdish issue known in France.
Since 2004, Alexie has run the Library of the Institut Kurde de Paris, and is a member of its scientific council, in the section of philosophies and Religions. She is one of the editors of the scholars’ review Études Kurdes (Kurdish Studies) and is the columnist of the monthly Bulletin de l’Institut Kurde, analyzing the Kurdish political, social and cultural news.