Kurdish independence: What it could mean for the Middle East

[Aslan]

THE KURDS are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East which has not yet achieved political independence.

Throughout the 20th century and to this day, Kurds in Iraq and Iran dream of fully-fledged independence.

In Turkey, both the PKK and the moderate Kurdish parties are demanding cultural freedom and some autonomy.

The few Kurds in Syria just wanted full citizenship.

At present the chances for a Greater Kurdish State are slim. However, in view of the present turmoil in the Middle East, the unexpected may happen.

If Syria disintegrates, the Kurdish areas may establish strong ties with autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. If Iraq disintegrates and Iraqi Kurdistan no longer receives oil revenues from Baghdad, it may decide on independence. Even now, the Kurdish autonomous region is already enjoying a great and growing degree of independence.

If Iraq disintegrates, the Kurds will have the military power to annex oil-rich Kirkuk.

If the government in Turkey reaches an autonomy agreement with its Kurds, the creation of two autonomous Kurdish regions in Turkey and Syria, cooperating closely with each other and with a de-facto independent Iraqi Kurdistan, is feasible.

As for Iran, in 1946 it saw the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad seceding from the Iranian state. If the Iranian central government is weakened a de-facto independent Kurdish zone is possible.

The next phase may be some kind of independent or semi-independent state/entity of Greater Kurdistan (GK). Either a fully independent GK will emerge or an unusual entity may appear: four Kurdish zones some of which, or all, are equally connected to their mother states and to each other.

The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is receiving around US$14 billion annually from Baghdad -12 per cent of the annual Iraqi budget.

The KRG has its own militia and police, a parliament, government and de-facto independent economy and an independent education system. Good relations with Turkey and Iran enable Kurdistan to easily import from and export to three friendly neighbours.

The Kurds enjoy therefore almost all the benefits of independence.

Even the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, which is likely to be the first nucleus of any GK, still faces serious difficulties in uniting the Barazani and Talabani areas and camps - in Erbil and Sulaimani provinces respectively.

Should Kurdistan-Iraq be connected with the Turkish Kurds it will have to learn to work with a much larger partner.

Political rivalries are unavoidable, but there are also cultural differences.

There are also unfavourable views of the Turkish Kurds held by many Iraqi Kurds.

The Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is being run like two private estates at present. The two main parties are controlled by the two leaders and the parties control the government in equal shares.

Most of the employment is in government service including very large military and police forces and there is little local entrepreneurial economy.

Because the Iraqi part of Greater Kurdistan will have oil and gas it may impose its system on the others in exchange for sharing its wealth. If Iraq loses its Kurdish areas and Kirkuk to a GK, it will lose 10 to 15 per cent of its territory, and between 20 and 25 per cent of its oil reserves.

Turkey will lose 15- 20 per cent of its territory, and Iran will lose 4-5 per cent. Syria will lose 5-10 per cent of its territory, including some oil fields in the north east.

The most likely ally in the Middle East will be Israel. The Kurds are Sunni-Muslims by majority and many of them dislike Israel, but in the past their most important leader, Mustafa al-Barzani worked closely with the Israelis and most Kurdish intellectuals are secular and very sympathetic to Israel.

The Kurdish political elite is, by majority, pro-Western. Even though the Turkish PKK is Marxist, it is not pro-Russian.

The Kurds will make every effort to win EU and American support. A GK is potentially a solid ally of the West.

A Greater Kurdistan will be an attractive exploration region for the main international oil companies. Until recently Iraqi Kurdistan’s reserves were estimated at 45bn barrels.

At present Iraqi Kurdistan’s production is planned to reach one million barrels a day by 2015, to be doubled by 2017.

The Iraqi Kurds need and receive Turkish goodwill. Turkey announced recently it would cooperate with oil companies that would build new oil pipelines from Kurdistan-Iraq. The Kurds need also Turkish know-how.

The Turks, for their part, need Kurdish oil and gas.

At present the KRG’s economy is thriving mainly on oil revenues from Baghdad. However, there is potential for a large petro-chemical industry and for an educational revolution.