Roj Bash Kurdistan

On Monday, Kurdish militants made strategic gains in northeast Syria, capturing nineteen towns from Islamist rebels after three days of heavy clashes. The victory caps a period of increasing autonomy for Syrian Kurds, who have remained (relatively) neutral in the country’s nearly three-year-old civil war.

But the success of this weekend’s operation belies the tensions dominating what has come to be called Western Kurdistan (or more poetically, Rojava, which means “where the sun sets” in Kurdish). The dominant Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), has profited from the chaos in Syria, close ties to Turkey’s Kurdish faction, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and, some claim, a tacit agreement with President Assad’s regime to assert its dominance over the region. Rival Kurdish parties in the region have made allegations of PYD’s heavy-handed rule on par with the Baath regime. (PYD leaders counter that other parties are harboring foreign agendas.)

The internecine strife isn’t surprising. Syria’s conflict opened the doors for an unprecedented opportunity at far-reaching Kurdish autonomy, as well as for control over rich oil and gas resources. Cross-border tensions are also at play here, namely with Iraqi Kurds. Though purportedly working towards the same goal – a united Kurdistan – the PYD and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have butted heads over the form of a pan-Kurdish council. After negotiations between the two entities failed in 2012, the KRG gave its backing to a rival Kurdish faction in Syria, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S). Tensions came to a head this May when KRG president Massoud Barzani sent armed militants into Syria to engage PYD forces, reportedly at the urging of Turkey, and closed parts of the Iraqi-Syria border. Barzouni backed down, but the Iraqi-Syria divide among Kurds remains palpable: Muslim was denied entry to Iraqi Kurdistan in late October.

The unraveling tapestry of loyalties threatens upcoming Geneva II peace talks – already a Herculean, if not Sisyphean, challenge: some Kurdish parties are insisting that KRG representatives attend, adjunct to the main rebel coalition; the PYD wants to go as an independent Kurdish movement. Further complicating the picture is Muslim’s belief that a Syria solution must include Assad – in direct opposition with rebel demands. Muslim stated: “We have nothing in common with them [Assad’s forces.]… But others are worse than the regime.”

But while the internal divisions plaguing the Kurds don’t bode well for the as-yet-to-be announced Geneva talks, they have proven convenient for Western powers uncomfortable with Kurdish unity. Notably the United States. Kurdish factions need look no further than their Iraqi brethren to discern Washington’s oscillating position on Kurdish autonomy. Despite at times encouraging Kurdish independence, notably by fostering the KRG’s ties with Turkey, the U.S. has largely stuck to its “one Iraq” policy.

When Syria’s war ends, look for a similar mentality to shape the West’s response. If Assad prevails, Kurdish independence will go from possible to unimaginable as he reasserts his pre-war hardline on the minority group. If he falls, however, the outcome for Kurds could be equally bleak. As regional powers vie over the spoils of Damascus, it is unlikely that anyone will endorse the Kurdish cause. Not neighboring nations battling to contain their own Kurdish elements, i.e., Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. And not Western states wary of enabling the further disintegration of Syria.

Battlefield victories notwithstanding, the shelf life of Kurdish autonomy will mirror that of Syria’s war.