Abadi may try to take full control of Kurdistan

[Anthea]

Iraq to end decades-old policy of semi-independent rule in Kurdistan

Iraq Reborn: In an exclusive interview for Patrick Cockburn's new series on the resurgence of this key Middle Eastern nation, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi reveals how Baghdad will hammer home its twin victories over Isis and the northern Kurds

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is triumphant as he describes his country’s security forces driving out ISIS from its last strongholds in western Iraq. “Our advances have been fantastic,” he said in an interview with The Independent in Baghdad. “We are clearing the deserts of them right up to the border with Syria.” Isis is being eradicated in Iraq three years after its columns were threatening to capture Baghdad.

Once criticised as vacillating and weak, Mr Abadi – who became Prime Minister in August 2014 – is now lauded in Baghdad for leading the Iraqi state to two great successes in the past four months: one was the recapture of Mosul from Isis in July after a nine-month siege; the other was the retaking of Kirkuk in the space of a few hours on 16 October without any resistance from Kurdish Peshmerga.

The son of a neurosurgeon in Baghdad, Mr Abadi, 65, spent more than 20 years of his life in exile in Britain before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Trained as an electrical engineer, he gained a PhD from the University of Manchester, before working in different branches of industry. A member of the Shia opposition Dawa party from a young age, two of his brothers were killed by Saddam Hussein’s regime and a third imprisoned. He returned to Iraq in 2003 where he became an MP and a leading figure in the ruling Dawa party.

As the man with the strongest claim to be the architect of the two biggest victories ever won by the Iraqi state, Mr Abadi’s reputation has soared at home and abroad. He is particularly pleased that there were so few casualties when Iraqi forces retook the great swath of territory disputed with the Kurds, which stretches from Syria in the west to Iran in the east. “I gave orders to our security forces that there should be no bloodshed,” he says, explaining that fighting the Peshmerga would make reconciliation difficult between the Kurds and the government.

Soft-spoken and conciliatory, Mr Abadi is determined to end the quasi-independence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that dates back to Saddam Hussein’s defeat after his invasion of Kuwait in 1991. He says: “All border crossings in and out of Iraq must be under the exclusive control of the federal state.” This includes the Kurdish oil pipeline to Turkey at Faysh Khabour, by which they once hoped would assure their economic independence, as well as the main Turkish-Iraqi land route at Ibrahim Khalil in the north west KRG. This crossing has been Iraqi Kurdistan’s lifeline to the rest of the world for a quarter of a century. Iraqi officials will likewise take over the international side of the airports in the Kurdish cities of Irbil and Sulaimaniyah.

These administrative changes do not sound dramatic, but they effectively end the semi-independence of the Iraqi Kurds which they had built up over the past 26 years. Kurdish president Masoud Barzani, who is to give up his post on 1 November, put these gains at risk when he held a referendum on Kurdish independence on 25 September.

Mr Abadi is in a strong position because the KRG’s two biggest neighbours, Turkey and Iran, agree with him on re-establishing federal control of the border and Kurdish oil exports. Mr Abadi says the Turks admit that “they made a mistake” in the past in dealing directly with the KRG and not with the central government in Baghdad. He emphasises that he will not be satisfied with Iraq government officials having a symbolic “spot” at different crossing points on the border, but they must have exclusive control of borders and international flights. Asked if this would include visas, Mr Abadi says: “This is a must.”

He wants the Peshmerga either to become part of the Iraqi government security forces or a small local force. He is curious to know how many Peshmerga there really are, expressing scepticism that there are really 300,000 men under arms as claimed by the Kurdish authorities. He says: “I have been told by many leaders in Kurdistan that there is a small fighting force and the rest stay at home.”

He recalls that when he became Prime Minister in 2014 after Isis unexpectedly captured Mosul, he made inquiries as to why five Iraq divisions had collapsed. He found that the main reason was corruption and in many units half the soldiers were drawing their salaries but were not there. He suspects the Peshmerga operate the same corrupt system, which he says would explain “why they failed to defend the borders of KRG [against Isis] in 2014 and had to seek the help of the US and Iran”.

The number of the Peshmerga may be in dispute, but Mr Abadi is adamant that “I am prepared to pay those Peshmerga under the control of the federal state. If they want to have their local small force – it must not be that large – then they must pay for it.” He says that the KRG must not become “a bottomless well” for federal payments. He would also expect Kurdish government expenditure to be audited in the same way as spending in Baghdad.

If all these changes are implemented then Kurdish autonomy will be much diminished. It is easy to see why Mr Barzani is stepping down to avoid the humiliation of giving up so much of his authority. Resistance by the Kurdish leadership will be difficult since they are divided and discredited by the Kirkuk debacle. But Mr Abadi’s strength is that for the first time since 1980, the Kurds do not have any backers in neighbouring states and the US has done little during the crisis except wring its hands at the sight of its Kurdish and Iraqi government allies falling out. When Mr Barzani unwisely forced Washington to choose between Baghdad and Irbil, the Americans were always going to choose the Iraqi state.

Queried about Iranian influence on the Iraqi government. Mr Abadi is exasperated and derisive by turns, particularly about Qasem Soleimani, the director of foreign operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) whose negotiations with the Kurdish leadership have been reported as playing a decisive role in the retreat of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk.

“He definitely didn’t have any military role on the ground in the crisis [over Kirkuk],” says Mr Abadi. “I can assure you that he had zero impact on what happened in Kirkuk.” Mr Abadi says that it was he himself who called the Kurdish leadership and persuaded them not to fight and to withdraw the Peshmerga from the disputed territories.

A more substantive allegation is that the Hashd al-Shaabi, the powerful Shia paramilitary units which have fought alongside the Iraqi regular forces, are sectarian and under Iranian influence or control. Asked about his recent meeting with Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, who said the Hashd should “go home” or be dismantled, Mr Abadi said that there was either “a misquotation or misinformation” and Mr Tillerson seemed to be under the impression that the IRGC was fighting in Iraq and did not know that the Hashd were all Iraqis.

He said that Iraq had plenty of foreign advisers from the US, UK, France and elsewhere, including Iran, but the number of Iranian advisers was only 30, well down from 110 a few years ago. As for the Hashd, he said they had to be under government control, well-disciplined and to have no political role, particularly not in the Iraqi general election on 12 May 2018 which he pledged not to postpone.

Mr Abadi is in a strong position because he is one of the first Iraqi leaders whose government has good relations with all Iraq’s neighbours: Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. Iraq, a country deeply divided between different sects and ethnic groups, has traditionally been destabilised by domestic opponents of the central government combining with state sponsors abroad who supply money, weapons and a sanctuary. This is not happening for the moment, which is why the Kurdish leadership is so isolated.

Part of Mr Abadi’s success during the Kirkuk crisis stemmed from disastrous miscalculations made by Mr Barzani about the reaction of Baghdad and the rest of the world to the independence referendum. Bur Mr Abadi showed an acute sense of how to exploit his opportunities.Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who once supported or tolerated al-Qaeda type organisations operating in Iraq, now fear them and are frightened of their dispersal as the self-declared Caliphate is destroyed.

“We got the international community on our side,” says Mr Abadi, reflecting on the course of the Kirkuk crisis. “We made it very simple: we said the unity of Iraq is very important for combating terrorism.” The division of Iraq, through the prospect of Kurdish independence, would open up cracks which ISIS would exploit. Mr Abadi certainly knew what buttons to press when it came to getting neighbouring states on his side. He is patient and strong-minded and the tides that once tore Iraq apart may now be running in his favour.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 28201.html

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Iraqi authorities gain first foothold at Kurdish frontier with Turkey

Iraqi troops deployed on Tuesday at one of the main land crossings with Turkey, gaining a foothold at the Kurdish-held frontier for the first time in decades and imposing one of Baghdad's central demands on the Kurds.

Iraq's entire land border with Turkey is located inside the Kurdish autonomous region, and has been controlled by the Kurds since before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

But since the Kurds staged a referendum on independence last month that Baghdad considers illegal, the central government has demanded a presence at all border crossing points.

The Iraqis set up positions between the Turkish and the Iraqi Kurdish checkpoints at the border crossing between the Turkish town of Habur and the Iraqi Kurdish town of Fish-Khabur, a security source in Baghdad said.

Vehicles crossing the border would now be subject to three checks -- by Turks, Iraqi forces and the Kurds.

"Habur border gate has been handed over to the central government as of this morning," Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim told members of his ruling AK Party in parliament in Ankara.

Officials from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said they had not relinquished control of the crossing. Discussions were ongoing to allow Iraqi "oversight" at the border, Hoshyar Zebari, a former Iraqi foreign minister now working as an advisor to the KRG, told Reuters.

An Iraqi official showed Reuters pictures of the Iraqi flag being raised at the border gate, where Iraqi and Turkish soldiers were deployed and Turkish flags also hoisted.

The issue of control of the border crossing is of crucial importance for the landlocked Kurdish region. The Fish-Khabur crossing is the site of the main oil export pipeline for northern Iraq, and crude exports through it are the principal source of funds for the Kurds.

BALANCE SHIFTS

The balance of power between Iraqi central government forces and the autonomous Kurdish region has been transformed since the Kurds staged their referendum on Sept. 25.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi ordered his forces to recapture all territory held by the Kurds outside the borders of their autonomous region, and most of it was seized this month within a matter of days.

Baghdad is also demanding control of all border crossings with Turkey and Iran. Abadi has won backing from both Tehran and Ankara for his moves against the Kurds.

Iraq's military said a delegation headed by army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Othman al-Ghanmi was visiting the Fish-Khabur area to take control of Kurdish-held international border checkpoints with both Turkey and Syria.

Zebari, the Kurdish government advisor, said the Kurds were prepared to accept "Iraqis at the airports and border posts to have oversight, to make sure everyone is in compliance", but any such presence must be achieved through negotiations, not force.

The split between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government is a particular challenge for Washington which is closely allied to both sides. The United States had urged the Kurds not to hold the referendum, worried that it would precipitate a backlash.

The referendum and ensuing dispute with Baghdad has also exposed deep rifts within the Kurdish leadership. Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani announced on Sunday that he would step down, and accused security forces loyal to a rival political party of "high treason" for yielding territory to the central government without a fight.

The KRG and the central government held talks Friday through Sunday to resolve their conflict.

Yildirim said Turkey had agreed to open another border gate with Iraq as part of a route that would lead to the city of Tal Afar, some 40 km west of Mosul and home to a predominantly ethnic Turkmen population.

http://www.todayonline.com/world/iraqi- ... ty-sources

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Abadi: We’ll bring Kurds to heel, as US shifts (slowly) in opposite direction

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi affirmed his intent to undertake two dramatic measures that would drastically weaken the Kurdistan Region.

Abadi said that he “wants the Peshmerga to become part of the Iraqi government security forces or a small local force,” The Independent’s Patrick Cockburn reported on Monday.

Abadi also told Cockburn, “All border crossings in and out of Iraq must be under the exclusive control of the federal state.”

That would include, according to Cockburn, the Kurdish oil pipeline to Turkey at Faysh Khabour and the border crossing to Turkey, where customs collection has been a major source of income since 1991 when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was established in the wake of the Gulf War.

However, Abadi appears to have spoken in disregard of Iraqi law.

Under the 2005 constitution—Article 110—customs are a function shared among the federal, regional, and provincial governments. Article 115 makes such revenues subject to Kurdistan’s legal supremacy.

Abadi’s plans for the Peshmerga are equally dubious. The Peshmerga played a crucial role in resisting the Islamic State (IS), after the Iraqi Army—six divisions—collapsed in 2014.

Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of coalition forces in Iraq, hailed the Peshmerga at an Aug. 31 press briefing, shortly before his tour of duty ended.

“The Peshmerga were instrumental in stopping the onslaught of [IS] in 2014 and 2015,” Townsend told reporters.

“Across much of northern Iraq, it was the Kurdish Peshmerga who held the line,” he said.

Indeed, Rep. Trent Franks (R, Arizona) has introduced legislation that describes the Peshmerga as “America’s most effective partner” in fighting IS and notes that nearly 2,000 Kurdish fighters have died in that conflict.

As Abadi shifts to an ever more heavy-handed, imperious stance toward the Kurds, the State Department—which has the lead on Iraq in US policymaking—has shifted, somewhat, in the opposite direction.

Kurds, and their friends, were dismayed at the US silence, as Iraqi forces, in combination with Iranian-backed militias, using US military equipment, including Abrams tanks, attacked the much more lightly-armed Peshmerga in Kirkuk and elsewhere.

Yet, a few positive points are emerging in the US position. The question is whether the change is occurring fast enough and whether the US is applying sufficient pressure on Abadi and his government.

On Monday, the State Department issued a statement welcoming Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani’s decision not to seek another term, as it hailed him as “a historic figure and courageous leader,” and reiterated an earlier call for negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil.

A third party is essential for any productive negotiations. It could be the US, the UN, or an interested party, like France. But, without a mediator, such talks would be “absurd,” as one experienced observer put it.

The US has also said Iraq’s seizure of the disputed territories “in no way changes their status—they remain disputed until their status is resolved in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution,” as the State Department affirmed on Oct. 20.

Monday’s State Department statement added, “A strong (KRG] within a unified and federal Iraq is essential to its long-term stability.”

The call for a “strong” KRG echoed language used by National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster 11 days before, when he spoke at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD).

“Part of a strong Iraq is a strong Kurdistan Region,” McMaster said. He later explained that Iran had “played a role” in the attack on Kirkuk. It had schemed to divide the Kurdish parties, and used “those divisions to assert [its] own interests.”

Thus, a strong, united KRG would be a counter to Iran, as Iran seeks to divide the Kurds and bring them under its sway.

John Hannah, National Security Adviser to Vice-President Dick Cheney, and now senior counselor at the FDD, spoke similarly to Kurdistan 24.

“Unfortunately, [recent events] have left the KRG weaker than at any point since 2003,” Hannah stated.

“Arguably, the greatest success of the entire US project in Iraq—the establishment of a vibrant, pro-American [KRG]—now teeters perilously close to the edge of outright collapse,” he said.

The Kurdistan referendum was “ill-timed,” in Hannah’s view, but it is also a thing of the past.

“There exists a widespread perception across the Middle East,” Hannah cautioned, that “America opted to stand on the sidelines and watch as one of its most loyal wartime allies was cowed into submission by forces beholden to [Quds Force commander] Qassem Soleimani and the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps].”

Hannah suggested that “moving forward,” the administration would be wise to “take a much more active stance in working for an immediate end to hostilities, concrete steps at de-escalation, and the commencement of negotiations to force a basis for constructive, long-term relations between a re-strengthened KRG and a sovereign, independent Iraqi government.”

One can only hope that senior US figures see that as well.

Editing by Karzan Sulaivany

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/2b85 ... 518db7e7b2

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Goods, people pass through 3 checkpoints to enter Kurdistan from Turkey

ZAKHO, Kurdistan Region – The office of the Kurdish-controlled Ibrahim Khalil land gate with Turkey has said in a statement on Wednesday that they have not relinquished the border crossing to Iraqi authorities, a day after the Turkish government allowed the Iraqi army to open a checkpoint between the Turkish and Kurdish sides, meaning that trade and movements of people must now be inspected at three checkpoints.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, and Turkish counterpart Binali Yildirim have separately said that the federal government will be in control of the Kurdish and Turkish border and that the move is constitutional.

Border traffic continues as normal, according to the Kurdish statement, adding that the law does not allow neither the Peshmerga or the Iraqi military to take control of any border crossing, including Ibrahim Khalil, also called Habur on the Turkish side.

The gate has been under the Kurdish control since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government following the First Gulf War in 1991. It is the main Kurdish gateway to world markets where the trade exchange totals in the billions of dollars. The crossing is located in the undisputed and constitutionally recognized Kurdistan Region.



The Iraqi government has demand that Erbil hand over all international entry points, including the two Kurdish airports of Erbil and Sulaimani, as part of its measures against the Kurdish government following an overwhelming vote for independence from Iraq held on September 25.

The Iraqi and Kurdish militaries have held a series of talks since an October 27 ceasefire announced by the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. But no final agreements have been made regarding the fate of Iraqi forces being deployed to all disputed or Kurdistani areas and border crossings.

The Kurdish Peshmerga insist that the Iraqi government respect a US-brokered agreement that stipulates the Peshmerga to keep all areas it was in control before the Mosul offensive in October 2016. Iraq, emboldened by the takeover of Kirkuk and elsewhere in the disputed areas since October 16, is demanding to roll back Peshmerga to the so-called Green Line that was in place between the two before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The United States have called on both Erbil and Baghdad to begin talks under the Iraqi constitution, while the United Kingdom called for a timeline for the talks to begin. France, with whom the Kurds have had good relations, has also pushed for such conversations.

Erbil has made a compromise by offering to freeze the Kurdish vote for independence in return for open dialogue with Baghdad, but this has been rejected by PM Abadi who demanded the vote be annulled before any talks begin.

Turkey's presidency on Wednesday has again called on the Kurdistan Region to declare the vote null and void.

The Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said Ankara will continue its relations with the Kurdistan Region taking into account recent developments in Iraq, adding that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will see Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani at an opportune time.

No Turkish-Iraqi forces at Ibrahim Khalil gate with Turkey, officials

http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/011120174

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Abadi Remakes Iraq as Washington Searches for a Policy

Several Humvees from Iraq’s 16th Infantry Division were disabled in battle with Kurdish Peshmerga near the town of Makhmur in northern Iraq on October 24. The Peshmerga, also driving U.S.-made Humvees, towed the Iraqi vehicle away. The outcome of the clash is symbolic of a policy in Iraq that is increasingly in tatters as the U.S.-trained Iraqi army clashes with U.S.-trained Peshmerga over areas that the American-backed 2005 constitution in Iraq defined as disputed between Baghdad’s central government and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government.

Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi is trying to draw attention away from the clashes with the Kurds through an unprecedented whirlwind tour of neighboring countries. He has tried to be all things to all his neighbors. In Saudi Arabia he sought to illustrate his commitment to U.S. policy and give Secretary of State Rex Tillerson a win in the region. Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy for Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, praised the visit on October 22 as “breakthrough diplomacy over last 9 months by Secretary Tillerson, Iraqi, Saudi leaders. Vital to post-ISIS stabilization in region.” Then al-Abadi flew to Jordan for a meeting with King Abdullah. Muqtada al-Sadr, the influential Iraqi Shia cleric and politician, also visited Jordan the same day. Then al-Abadi flew back to Baghdad for a second meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State. Tillerson had said that Iranian-backed Shia militias, called Hashed al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Forces should “go home,” and al-Abadi wanted to press to him that the forces were part of the Iraqi governing institutions. They should “be encouraged because they will be the hope of the country and the region.”

The role of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq is especially contentious because many of its leaders, such as Hadi al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, were trained in Iran. Al-Muhandis was listed by the U.S. Department of Treasury in 2009 as the head of Kataib Hezballah “for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq.” He and Kataib Hezballah “have committed, directed, supported or posed a significant risk of committing acts of violence against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces,” according to a 2009 department statement. Eight years later the United States’ closest ally in Iraq praises the role of the militias al-Muhandis leads. On October 26, as al-Muhandis and al-Amiri led members of the Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraqi security forces on attacks on Kurds near the Syrian border, al-Abadi was in Iran meeting with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. According to PressTV, which is linked to the Iranian regime, Khamenei told al-Abadi to be “cautious about the Americans’ deceptions and never put trust in them.” The Iranian leader also claimed that the United States had created ISIS “but now that the terrorists have been defeated by the Iraqi government and people, they [America] pretend to be supportive of this important development.”

Al-Abadi has cynically and marvelously balanced the United States and Iran. The United States is taking credit for a “diplomatic win,” as Foreign Policy described Tillerson’s work, while Al Jazeera has called al-Abadi’s trip a “victory lap.” Al-Abadi has scolded Tehran and Washington, saying he wants to work with both. “But please don’t bring your trouble inside Iraq, you can sort it anywhere else.” The current situation is often compared to a chess game, where the United States is losing.

The Iraqi leader wants to present his country as unified and on the road to stability, but the recent conflict with the Kurdistan region shows that this is largely an illusion. In order to take back Kirkuk, which the Kurdish Peshmerga had defended from ISIS for three years, Iran’s Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani came to Iraq to seal a deal with politicians from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the three major political parties in the Kurdish region. Then, while al-Abadi traveled abroad, the Popular Mobilization Forces’ Shia militias and elements of the Iraqi Army, including U.S.-trained units from the 16th Infantry Division, 9th armored, Federal Police and Emergency Response Division, launched attacks on Kurdish positions in Altun Kupri, Makhmur, Telskop and near Zummar.

The latter battle on October 26 is particularly important strategically because it is close to where the Syrian, Iraq and Turkish borders meet. The sole open border crossing between Syria and Iraq is at Faysh Khabur. This has also been a conduit for vehicles sent by the United States to assist the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting ISIS. It is near a pipeline that runs from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Capturing this would allow Baghdad to bypass the Kurdish region to export the more than three hundred thousand barrels of oil that could potentially be produced by the Kirkuk fields seized on October 16.

Al-Abadi’s visit to Turkey on October 25, which is when he met President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was aimed at securing control over the border between the Kurdistan region and Turkey as well as discussing the oil pipeline. According to the Daily Sabah “Anakara is ready to provide support for efforts to operate the oil pipeline with Baghdad.” A day of battle on October 26 left dozens dead and wounded on both sides about ten kilometers from Faysh Khabur and the pipeline. A ceasefire followed the battle and provided a pause, but Iraq and its allies in Turkey and Iran remain resolved to get to—and secure—the border. Achieving this goal would weaken the Kurdistan Regional Government and erode the unique autonomy it has enjoyed since 2003. The KRG, which is suffering an internal political crises after losing Kirkuk, has devoted veteran Peshmerga officers to defend the area, but they have seen no indication that Washington will help mediate with Baghdad.

Perceptions of Iraq policy may be changing in Washington. House Speaker Paul Ryan called on Iraq to heed Tillerson’s concern about the role of Iranian-backed Shia militia. He used a tweet to highlight a section relating to support for the KRG. Senators John McCain, Chuck Schumer, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and U.S. Representative Trent Franks have all spoken out in support of the United States standing with the KRG. “These aggressive moves against Kurds in Iraq orchestrated by Iran makes them stronger at the expense of US,” Rubio said in an October 26 tweet.

The U.S.-led coalition, which is supporting Iraqi forces fighting in Anbar, has been noticeably silent on the Erbil-Baghdad clashes. It has put the coalition in an awkward position because until weeks ago they were advising and training some of the units now fighting Peshmerga, who the coalition was also training via the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center. “Coalition forces have not been involved in any of the recent events between the ISF and Peshmerga,” the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs Office wrote in an October 26 email. “We are deeply concerned with the recent violence in northern Iraq and strongly urge all sides to avoid escalatory actions.” Dialogue remains the best way to defuse tensions, the coalition says, and the destabilizing clashes “distract from the fight against ISIS and further undermine Iraq’s stability.”

Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says the KRG’s decision to hold a referendum in September created a crisis that Washington warned Erbil would erupt. “Kurds failed to secure any guarantees from the U.S. in advance or guarantees from other nominal allies in the Middle East.” He argues that Baghdad sensed weakness on the part of the Kurds and was “looking to press their advantage. This is brutal politics right now and they [Baghdad] appear to be in a position to extract concessions . . . we see an Iraqi government armed and trained by the U.S. taking steps to strategically weaken another U.S. ally and it is cringeworthy and begs for a stronger U.S. response.” He says we are “drifting sideways in a truly lamentable chapter in the Middle East.”

With the Iranian foothold in Iraq achieved at the same time as the United States is determined to roll back Iranian influence in the region, a key part of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, the Kurds are victims of being at the intersection of a changing policy. “What happens to the Kurds is a signal to what happens to other allies,” Schanzer says. The problem for the United States is that the new policy on Iran rolled out by Trump on October 13 will take months to put in place. Soleimani’s involvement in Kirkuk points to the fact that he advised the Iraqi government to act quickly before U.S.-Iran policy ramped up.

This leaves the United States wondering how to fix what has happened. With a small military footprint in Iraq devoted solely to defeating ISIS, all that Washington has done is use diplomatic pressure. U.S. ambassador Douglas Silliman worked to end clashes on October 24 near the Christian village of Telskop. However, given the U.S. devotion to Iraqi unity, the conflict is seen as an internal one and deeper involvement would be portrayed as mission creep. The need to maintain supplies flowing to the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, which is still fighting ISIS, means Baghdad is key to the possibility of opening a new border crossing at Rabiah to reroute supplies if need be. Saudi Gulf affairs minister Thamer al-Sabhan visited Raqqa with McGurk on October 17, the day after Iraq took Kirkuk from the Kurds. For the United States, the Saudi-Abadi connection is a priority, and the chance that Saudi Arabia will invest in Raqqa post-liberation means aid could also flow via Baghdad to eastern Syria. Balancing this interest along with the U.S. historic relationship with Erbil and Kurdistan autonomy leaves Washington without a clear policy to confront Baghdad if it continues to weaken the Kurdistan Regional Government.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/aba ... licy-23031

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Iraq says will control all border crossings even if by force

Baghdad (IraqiNews.com) Iraqi government will impose its control on the border crossings that are out of its control, even if by force, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s advisor has said.

“There are 29 exits out of the federal government’s control, which should return back,” Walid al-Helli said in a televised interview. “No one knows what the situation is at these crossings. We do not know if they are used to smuggle drugs, oil or terrorists or not.

In related news, the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper’s website has said that federal troops are few kilometers away from Faysh Khabur exit border, between Kurdistan and Syrian borders, awaiting commands from the armed forces to impose control in Nineveh.

A security source from the Rapid Response forces was quoted saying that “troops are deployed on the borders of Faysh Khabur region, north of Zummar.”

He added that troops are only three kilometers away from Peshmerga.

“The situation there is calm with no confrontations as operations are suspended,” he said adding that troops await orders to head toward Khabur border crossing, knows as Ibrahim al-Khalil, on borders between Kurdistan and Turkey, so Peshmerga hands it over.

On Sunday, Jabbar al-Yawar, secretary general of Peshmerga Ministry said that the recent confrontations with Iraqi troops left 60 fighters of Peshmerga killed and 150 others wounded.

https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/iraq ... ven-force/

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Iraqi VP supports Abadi for a second term with 'conditions'

Iraq's Sunni vice president has stated that he would back current Shiite Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for reelection next year based on certain conditions, particularly in regards to the Iran-backed militia, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), otherwise known as Hashd al-Shaabi.

"We support him but not without conditions," said Iraqi VP Osama al-Nujaifi in an interview with Reuters on Wednesday.

Al-Nujaifi is currently in Washington to discuss issues facing Iraq post-ISIS with the US State Department and congressional officials.

"There must be political agreement based on mutual interests of Iraqis, an exit from sectarian politics ... controlling the weapons, and the balance in relationship with countries ... If we agree on these things, we can be together," he added.

Al-Nujaifi said that Abadi must "determine his position" as he belongs to the Shiite Dawa party which has close ties to Iran.

He also stated that elections would be impossible if the weaponry of the Hashd was not brought under government control.

Some western officials believe Abadi is too weak to reign in the Shiite militias alone as the Iraqi central government approved to transform Hashd into a legal but separate military unit last year.

"This of course shapes a threat to stability in Iraq if these weapons are not controlled and melded with the armed forces," Nujaifi said. "If there's any political disagreement, it could turn into armed confrontations ... The only correct way is to meld these forces with the armed forces and to control them."

Hashd al-Shaabi is an umbrella of more than 60 groups who came together mid-2014 following a fatwa from Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani to drive out ISIS militants who were quickly gaining control of the country.

Leaders of Hashd are also pushing Baghdad to "recognize them as a part of the state's defense system and provide its fighters with salaries and pensions."

"The government should fulfill its responsibility of granting the rightful share of salaries for the members of Popular Mobilization Forces in the 2018 budget," Ahmad al-Assadi, Shiite member of the Iraqi Parliament and spokesperson for the Hashd, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) said last Thursday.

Demands from Hashd leaders come at a time when Iraq is preparing for general elections on May 15 as well as new budgets for 2018.

Kurds have condemned Iranian involvement in recent clashes between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces in the disputed areas since Iraqi military supported by Iran-backed Hashd took control of Kirkuk on October 16 as well as other disputed and border areas.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson who visited Saudi Arabia on October 22 called for Iranian "militias" to leave Iraq now that ISIS has almost been driven out of the country.

"Certainly Iranian militias that are in Iraq, now that the fighting against (ISIS) is coming to a close, those militias need to go home," Rex Tillerson said at a press conference in Riyadh.

http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/091120171

[Anthea]

Iraq plays with Iran and United States over control of its Shia militias

News media reports have portrayed Iran and the United States at odds over ultimate control of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) - a motley coalition of law enforcement agencies, military branches, and militias.

According to these reports, Iran backs the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Interior Ministry, while the US equips and trains the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS), the most capable unit of the ISF. Both countries compete for influence over the Iraqi Army.

Stuck in the middle, the Iraqi government has learned to play Iran and the United States against each other to reap the most power for itself.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi exercises direct control of the ICTS and the PMF by law. Analysts and journalists however contend that the PMF, an umbrella organization dominated by Shia militias, owes its allegiance not to the prime minister in Baghdad but to its financiers and arms dealers in Qom and Tehran.

The New Arab's interviews with militia fighters reveal the overlap behind both claims: according to them, Iran allegedly arms and funds the PMF but channels its support through the Prime Minister's Office, which disburses the military aid.

"Neither weapons nor any other kind of help can enter Iraq except through the Iraqi government, and the government is in turn supported by the PMF and the Army," asserted Yusuf al-Kalabi, a PMF official specializing in law.

"The PMF is a popular military body linked to the general command of the armed forces and participates in the military organization of the state."

Al-Kalabi added that Iranian advisors such as Major General Qasem Soleimani, of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, entered Iraq the same way.

"All advisors, whether Iranian, American, or otherwise, may only come with the permission of the Iraqi government as they are needed," Kalabi said.

Commanders in the Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah, two of the largest Iranian-backed militias in the PMF, confirmed al-Kalabi's assertions to The New Arab.

"We receive ammunition and weaponry from the Iranians but through and with the knowledge of the Prime Minister's Office," said Omran Wali, a Kataib Hezbollah commander based near Fallujah.

Omran's colleague Arfad continued: "Many Iranian advisors are staying with us, and their presence has been continuous. The Prime Minister's Office has requested them."

"There is an agreement between Iran and Iraq about security, and there is only one route for Iranian weapons: through the Prime Minister's Office," noted Sadiq al-Hussein, a Badr commander on the outskirts of Fallujah.

Hussein stressed the limited size of the Iranian contingent accompanying him to the front lines.

"The number of Iranian advisors is small: around ten," he added.

Udai Adnan, a high-ranking Badr commander in the eastern province of Diyala, thanked Iran for all that it had provided the PMF.

"We won't forget the help from Iran, and we are extremely grateful," he told The New Arab, noting the role of coordination with the ISF.

"The Iranian forces managed to stabilize our own forces and stop their disintegration. The Iranian government only deals with the Iraqi government, which then distributes the support and weaponry to the different factions."

Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for the Prime Minister's Office, ignored several questions sent over WhatsApp Messenger about the extent, legality, and role of Iranian support to the PMF, instead telling The New Arab the PMF remains under the command of the Prime Minister.

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indep ... each-other

[Anthea]

As riots spark worries of new crisis
Iraq’s Abadi mulls taking full control of penniless Kurdistan

MPs in Baghdad must have pinched themselves when a KRG delegation recently asked them for money. It might have been straight forward if Iraq’s PM could pay government salaries for taking control of the country.

But then the French got involved and elections are being rushed.

Barely weeks before, Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), heralded by Masoud Barzani its (then) President, soldiered ahead with the independence referendum plan, despite being told quite clearly not to do so by Baghdad and other regional players who had geopolitical and economic investments in Iraq. That led to a spectacular blunder as within days of the euphoria fading, oil fields in the Kirkuk region had been taken back by Iraqi forces making the elite in Erbil look at best stupid, and at worse, like a corrupt posy of amateurs playing monopoly with other people’s money.

The loss of Kirkuk cannot be underestimated in its political and economic impact. Until then, the KRG was producing 600,000 barrels of oil a day and barely managing to meet the (then) monthly overheads of a semi-autonomous state of around $700 million a month. The list of foreign investors who were not being paid monies promised in advanced oil sales for cash, was also growing.

According to British energy journalist Patrick Osgood Kurdistan Bureau Chief for the Iraq Oil Report, the KRG was frantically taking money from some deals to pay off others. “Recently, we know that Rosneft leant the KRG 1.3 billion dollars of which one billion was immediately to creditors in the UAE,” he told me.

According to other sources in Erbil who are fearful of reprisals for speaking to the press, “ministers recently brokered high interest rate loans with western energy consortiums just to make token payments into the central bank”.

Panic was the order of the day. The independence referendum was a byproduct of that frenzy which led to the present day catastrophe which has led to the climb down from the elite – which is made up of two ruling families, Barzani and Talabani. Today, that same double act is holding out the begging bowl to those who they considered to be brutal colonialists who they were apparently escaping from in the first place.

Abadi’s next move with the KRG

“If the Iraqi government doesn’t send the budget, we cannot pay the monthly salaries on time with the income we will be getting in 2018” is what the KRG-friendly news website Rudaw English reported was said in the Baghdad parliament on December 13.

The worry for both the KRG and Baghdad is that the country is about to collapse into a plume of chaos. It is believed that the central bank is only receiving a fraction of the $550 million (dropped from $700 million as state salaries have been slashed) it needs to pay government ministries and salaries and only has around $2 billion in reserves. The historical blunder by Erbil, combined with endemic corruption of public funds (which even irks the Americans), wide scale nepotism, and a wholesale contempt for anything which whiffs of democratic reform, has all culminated into a crisis building up which recently sparked street protests with a number of people shot dead. The corrupt elite in Erbil didn’t have any master plans to rebuild the economy and attract foreign investment for their own country, only how to continue the practice of the pyramid selling schemes with western oil firms which has now reached breaking point.

According to experts, the money from all of these investments – Russian and Turkish being the biggest ones – has all vanished into the black hole of infamous, secret public spending via the infamous Kurdistan International Bank. It’s not just that the KRG is broke, it’s also up to its neck in crippling debt. And it’s the fast and loose ‘loans’ which have brought the economy to its knees with a recent loan via a Swiss-based firm – doubling money for investors – which spooked the ex-prime minister of Kurdistan Barham Salihi so much, when I asked (via a third party) for a response. “He is too afraid to talk about that deal as he might be killed,” I was told.

The knuckleheads in Erbil have run out of answers. The Barzani-Talabani elite now are pushing for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018 – ideally before Iraqi’s own elections in May – and desperately needs to retrieve a trace of credibility with voters in the country. Getting a bail out from Baghdad might help.

Show me the money. The real money

But the price the KRG is asking is high. According to an Iraqi MP, Saad Al Muttalibi, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is not keen to help as the Kurds are being stubborn about transparency.

“They are not producing all of the information about account numbers and where all the money is now, because this is all linked to [the previous President] Barzani,” he told me. “Abadi is being very stubborn right now”.

The KRG are asking for a monthly cash hand out and for its debts of around $5.5 billion to be paid, but with no transparency. Understandably, Abadi is skeptical, especially when it is known how the Barzani and Talabani clans became so wealthy – with some claiming the deputy prime minister alone is worth around $ 3 billion.

Not bad for someone who started his career as a car mechanic.

But the spanner in the works for this elite is that it is widely known, both in Erbil and Baghdad, that it has profiteered from their positions. Abadi, like many, might argue that if they want to get re-elected in 2018 that they might have to dip their hands into their own pockets.

The big question is how Abadi plays this. If he appears kind to the Kurds, he will lose votes in the elections, which he is sure to win if he is tough on them. Yet if he is too tough, it might be that the country implodes into chaos and civil war, which might mean he will have to send the Iraqi army in – and then focus Kurds' minds once again on the common enemy, which might blow up in his face. To some extent, we are already at this point as recent reports in the KRG-aligned website Rudaw are claiming that Baghdad has positioned its troops just outside the capital.

In recent days, according to a pro-Assad website, “thousands” of protesters have taken to the streets in a number of KRG towns, angry at the state of public services and civil servants’ salaries being paid in fractions. Yet the same agency claimed on December 19 that the Iraqi PM had agreed to pay KRG government salaries, but will not pay the KRG debts to Russia and Turkey, amounting to $ 5.5 billion.

If this is true, then the Kurds would have no doubt given Abadi considerable concessions on oil, while the troops sent there are expected to convince KRG leaders they should quit while they are ahead, or pay for it dearly.

“Baghdad demands the KRG cancel the result of the referendum, which delivered an overwhelming yes for independence, and to hand over control of land borders, airports and oil facilities of the Kurdistan region”, according to Reuters on December 18.

Abadi has clearly lost his patience with the billionaires in Erbil and wants the whole shooting match, an audacious move which would have placed Baghdad at the top of the pecking order with Erbil’s creditors and international patrons who have joined the KRG debacle quite late in the day and might thwart his plans.

‘Strange to have president speaking in English’: #Macron blasts press conference organization as it fails to translate for Kurdish leader (VIDEO) https://t.co/oemTyFxRuo
— RT (@RT_com) December 3, 2017

Bargain basement hegemony…voila!

France’s Emmanuel Macron, never one to miss an opportunity in the Middle East to act as an international statesman, recently appeared on the KRG stage, desperate to place France somewhere on the Middle East’s map alongside the US and UK. According to Rudaw, now that “Lebanon is under the influence of Russia,” Elysee wants to restore its role in the region through Kurdistan. Ali Dolamari, KRG’s representative to France, told the media outlet that France wants to play a role in reconstructing Iraq after ISIS was defeated.

Given that it was the West – and in particular the EU – which can be blamed for letting the KRG go ahead with self-imposed calamity of Barzani’s preposterous independence referendum in the first place, it seems that the Kurds aren’t learning from their mistakes. Transparency in this country is what is required and yet neither France nor the EU, is willing or able to induce it. Indeed, it is a fitting irony that when the EU sends its MEPs to “monitor” the referendum – like Scottish independence hack Alyn Smith who arrived in Erbil, and shortly thereafter began spewing journalists with tweets, press releases and articles about the KRG’s independence bid – that the same MEP can’t be reached for a comment when asked about the KRG now and the gob-smacking accounts of graft which have plunged the country into the state it is in today.

And so there is a race on between the French who would ideally like to convince the KRG that Paris is their new geopolitical big brother against Baghdad which wants much more money and oil to not send the troops in. Of course, the third option is that Abadi just loses his patience and sends in the troops anyway, dismisses the Erbil elite and talks to Macron and reconstruction. At the time of writing this, there are reports that there will be elections within three months as a certain panic is setting in and politicians are jumping ship each day, repositioning themselves before it’s too late. Macron might have to get his skates on before Abadi makes that Erbil call.

https://www.rt.com/op-edge/413789-kurdi ... rg-crisis/